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COMPUTER PROGRAMS UNDER THE 
UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY SYSTEM:  SUI GENERIS 
LEGISLATION IS NEEDED 
 
 
JOSEPH FRANCIS AGNELLI, III* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Computers and computer software command an ever 
expanding and prominent role in the world, and are 
constantly evolving.  Thus, various international governments 
are fraught with enacting appropriate legislation associated 
with protection of computer software.  Should the United 
States Congress use copyright law, patent law, or a measure 
of both?  This is the predicament Congress has been faced 
with regarding the rapid evolvement of computer software. 
This article will attempt to resolve that dilemma. 
Section I of this article explores the different avenues of 
intellectual property protection presently available for 
computer software1 here in the United States.  Section II then 
discusses how the European Community has resolved the 
computer program crisis under European intellectual property 
law.  Lastly, section III will illustrate why sui generis2 
legislation would be the paramount way for Congress to 
attack the intricacy that is created by computer programs 
under American intellectual property law. 
                                                 
*The author is an attorney and 2007 graduate of the Southern New 
England School of Law. All opinions and/or inaccuracies are of this 
writer, and do not represent the opinions or views of the Faculty or 
Students of the Southern New England School of Law, or the Southern 
New England School of Law Roundtable Symposium Law Journal. 
1 The terms “software” and “program” will be used interchangeably 
throughout this article. 
2 Sui Generis has been defined as a body of law which is “[O]f its 
own kind or class; unique or peculiar.” BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1475 
(8th Ed., 2004). 
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I.  PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS UNDER 
              UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
              JURISPRUDENCE 
 
This section will scrutinize the present state of intellectual 
property protection for computer programs in the United 
States.  This section will begin with a discussion and analysis 
of copyright law, the simpler and more applicable, and will 
conclude with an analysis of patent law, the complex and 
controversial.  The goal of this section is to help you, the 
reader, fully understand the evolution and problems that 
computer programs pose to Congress and, more importantly, 
to the courts.  Hopefully, when you, the reader, are finished 
with this section, you will realize that action in the form of 
sui generis legislation needs to be taken to bring protection 
for computer programs into focus in American intellectual 
property jurisprudence. 
 
A. United States Copyright Law as Applied to 
                  Computer Programs. 
 
“From its beginning, the law of copyright has 
developed in response to significant changes 
in technology.”3 
 
Throughout relevant history, United States Copyright law 
emerged as the most applicable intellectual property 
protection available to computer programs.  This was due to 
the fact that computer programs and some of their related 
components tend to fit rather well into Copyright law.  For 
example, the computer programs and their user manuals have 
been considered writings,4 databases have sometimes been 
                                                 
3 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 
(1984), cited by Justice Walker in Computer Assoc. International, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992). 
4 See Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co., 462 F. 
Supp. 1003 (N.D.Tex.1978). 
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considered copyrightable compilations,5 and the visual 
displays on computer monitors can be considered graphic 
works.6  Also, the source code of a computer program, or the 
collection of statements or declarations which allows the 
computer programmer to communicate with the computer 
using a reserved number of instructions,7 and the object code, 
or the representation of code that a compiler or assembler 
generates by processing a source code file,8 are both 
copyrightable subject matter.9 
By way of background, the Copyright Office began 
accepting copyright applications for computer programs in 
1964.10  As computers posed a new and intricate area of 
technology, Congress established the National Commission 
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU) in 1974.11 The purpose of the CONTU was to 
study the implications of new and recent technologies, and to 
suggest that federal intellectual property law be revised to 
accommodate these changes.12 After significant hearings and 
research conducted by experts, the board comprising CONTU 
decided that “it was clearly the intent of Congress to include 
computer programs within the scope of copyrightable subject 
matter in the Act of 1976.”13   
                                                 
5 But see Feist v. Rural Tel., 499 U.S. 340, (1991), and Bellsouth 
Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publ’g, Inc., 933 F.2d 952 (11th 
Cir.1991). 
6 David W. Carstens, Legal Protection of Computer Software: 
Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 13, 45 (1994). 
7 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (D. 
Colo.1992).  
8 See  GCA Corp. v. Chance, C-82-1063-MHP, 1982 WL 1281 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug 31,1982). 
9 Carstens, supra note 6; see also 17 U.S.C. §106 (1988). 
10 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND 
RELATED STATES DOCTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 846 (REV. 5TH ED., 2004) (1973). 
11 See National Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works, Final Report (1978) [hereinafter CONTU]; see also 
Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for 
Application Programs, 41STANFORD L. REV.. 1045, 1046 (1989). 
12 Menell, supra note 11, at 1046. 
13 CONTU, supra note 11, at 16. 
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More significantly, the 1980 amendments to the 1976 
Copyright Act14 helped bring the Act up to speed with 
advances in technology,15 including computer programs.  The 
amended Act defined a computer program as “a set of 
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a 
computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 16  
The inclusion of such a definition in section 101 of the 
Copyright Act is an indication that Congress may have 
intended computer programs to be analyzed as copyrightable 
pursuant to that definition.17 The problem with this strict 
definition is that it excludes from copyright manuals, flow 
charts, and any other representation that cannot be used to 
bring about that certain result.18  However, in Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,19 the Third 
Circuit held that so long as the computer program is original 
and fixed in a tangible medium, it will be copyrightable 
subject matter “whether it is expressed in words, in a flow 
chart, in source code or object code, and whether it is 
embodied in paper, magnetic disk tape or semiconductor 
chip.”20  Thus, the courts broadened the scope of the “fixed” 
requirement, opening the door for computer programs to 
become copyrightable subject matter. 
But what does “fixed” actually imply?  Section 101 of the 
Copyright Act sheds some light, and reads “[A] work is fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a 
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, 
is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a 
                                                 
14 Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2544 (1976) (codified as amended 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980)). 
15 BERNARD A. GALLER, SOFTWARE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION: COPYRIGHT AND PATENT ISSUES FOR COMPUTER AND 
LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 3 (Foreword by Jack E. Brown, 1995).  
16 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 77. 
17 William F. Patry, Copyright and Computer Programs: It’s all in 
the Definition,14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 23 (1996). 
18 Id. at 32. 
19 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,  
(3d Cir.1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). 
20  Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249 
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period of more than transitory duration.”21  Section 101’s 
definition of “fixed” continues, “[A] work consisting of 
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” 
for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being 
made simultaneously with its transmission.”22  The latter half 
of this definition would seem to be applicable to computer 
programs, and the Third Circuit’s decision in Williams 
Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc.23 discusses this 
requirement, “fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” 
as it applies to video games. 
In Williams, the court was presented with a dispute over 
two coin-operated video games, “Defender” manufactured by 
Williams Electronics, and “Defense Commander” 
manufactured by Artic International.  Williams’ game, 
“Defender,” comprised several unique and original audio-
visual features.24  Artic’s video game, “Defense 
Commander,” was virtually identical to Williams’.25  As a 
result, Williams brought suit against Artic alleging 
infringement of three of its “Defender” copyrights.  The 
District Court agreed with Williams that Artic had in fact 
infringed three of its copyrights.26  Artic appealed the lower 
courts judgment.  The issue facing the appellate court was 
whether the audio-visual copyrights of “Defender” satisfied 
the “fixed in any tangible medium of expression” 
requirement.27  
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 
lower court by holding that the audio-visual features of the 
“Defender” video game were fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression because there was always a repetitive sequence of 
                                                 
21 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
22 Id. 
23 Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 
1982).  
24 Id. at 872. 
25 Id. at 872–73. 
26 These acts of infringement included the infringement of the 
computer program copyright for the “Defender” game by selling kits 
which contained a copy of the video game; and infringement of two of 
Williams’ audiovisual copyrights for the video game by selling copies of 
the game “Defender.” Id. at 873. 
27 See id. at 873–74; see also GALLER, supra note 15, at 48. 
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a substantial amount of the sounds and images of the game, 
of which remained unchanged and constant regardless of how 
the player operated the game.28  The Third Ciruit also found 
in favor of Williams on the object code issue and rejected 
Artic’s argument that object codes cannot be protected 
because a copy must be intelligible to human beings and is 
only intended as a means of communication to humans.29  
The Third Circuit held, in response, that “[A] ‘copy’ is 
defined to include a material object in which a work is fixed 
‘by any method now known or later developed, and from 
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.’”30 31 
Thus, in summary, the Williams case held that computer 
programs, which display on screen images, (like a vast 
majority of software on the market) are copyrightable 
because they are “fixed” in a “tangible medium”32 as required 
by the Copyright Act. 33  
                                                 
28 See Williams, 685 F.2d at 874; see also GALLER, supra. 
29 Williams,. 685 F.2d at 876–77; see also GALLER, supra. 
30 Williams, 685 F.2d at 877; see also 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976). 
31 The Williams case came after a slew of earlier cases involving 
similar copyrighted video games and their infringement.  See e.g., Atari, 
Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607 
(7th Cir. 1982) partly superseded by statute as stated in Scandia Down 
Corp. v. Eroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, (7th Cir. Ill. 1985) (the Atari court 
found for infringement and held that even though the defendant’s game 
was not "virtually identical" to Pac-Man, it captured the "total concept 
and feel" of and was substantially similar to Pac-Man); Stern Elecs., Inc. 
v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir., 1982) (which held that the player's 
participation did not withdraw the audiovisual work from copyright 
eligibility); and Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. 
Neb. 1981)(which held that the fact that the audiovisual works [video 
game] could not be viewed without a machine did not mean the works 
were not fixed). 
32 The tangible medium used here was the computer monitor, which, 
as the court held, was the equivalent of a machine.  
33 It is important to note that several aspects of the Artic game 
“Defense Commander” indicated that it was practically copied verbatim 
from Williams’ game, “Defender.”  For example, an identical error of an 
earlier version of “Defender” showed up within the “Defense 
Commander” game at the exact same time it showed up in “Defender.” 
Williams,. 685 F.2d at 876, n.6.  In addition, and quite amusingly, both 
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Two other landmark decisions which help exemplify why 
computer programs are considered copyrightable subject 
matter include Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental 
Laboratory, Inc.,34 and Computer Associates International, 
Inc. v. Altai, Inc.35 
Whelan involved a dispute over a computer program 
which was designed to aid in the management of dental 
laboratories.36  Whelan alleged that Dentcom’s licensing of 
the Dentalab program, and Dentcom’s program itself, 
infringed Whelan Associates' copyright in Dentalab.37  The 
District Court found for Whelan on all claims.38  The District 
Court held that Elaine Whelan was the sole author of the 
Dentalab program and that the agreement between Jaslow and 
Whelan made it apparent that the parties intended ownership 
                                                                                                     
games displayed a listing of high scores achieved by past players by 
listing their initials, and the Artic game listed the initials of employees of 
Williams who achieved those scores on the “Defender” game. Id. at 876, 
n.6.  Finally, Williams inputted a “hidden” copyright notice deep inside 
its memory devices and when the contents of Artic’s memory were pulled 
up, so did Williams’ “hidden” copyright notice. Id. 
34 Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). 
35 Computer Assoc. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 
1992), affirmed by 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6363 (2d Cir. N.Y. Apr. 3, 
1996), cert. denied 523 U.S. 1106 (1998). 
36 By way of background, the computer program at issue was called 
“Dentalab” and was written by an employee, Ms. Elaine Whelan, of an 
outside company, Strohl Systems Group, Inc.  “Dentalab” was written in a 
computer program language called Event Driven Language (EDL). The 
program was successful and began operation at Jaslow in March of 1979. 
Whelan,797 F.2d at 1225–26.  Ms. Whelan left Strohl shortly after 
developing Dentalab and formed her own company, Whelan Associates, 
Inc. Id. at 1226.  After the formation of Whelan Associates, Jaslow 
entered into a written agreement with Whelan for the exploitation of the 
“Dentalab” program and to share in the profits. Id.  Without informing 
Whelan of his plan, Rand Jaslow of Jaslow Labs, decided that the 
Dentalab program would benefit all other dental labs, like Jaslow, and 
began developing Dentalab in BASIC, as opposed to EDL, language. Id.  
[Many smaller dental labs computer systems did not operate in EDL 
language].  Rand then formed his own company, Dentcom, and sought to 
terminate his agreement with Whelan.  It was this program that was the 
alleged infringer of Whelan’s EDL Dentalab program. Id. 
37 Whelan, 797 F.2d. at 1227. 
38 Id. at 1228. 
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to lie solely with Whelan.39 The court also determined that 
Whelan’s copyright in Dentalab was in fact a valid copyright, 
and Dentcom’s twenty-three sales of the Dentalab computer 
program were violations40 of this copyright.41 Finally, the 
district court held that the Dentalab copyright was infringed 
because the “overall structure” of Dentcom was substantially 
similar to the overall structure of Dentalab.42 
On appeal, the Third Circuit adopted the substantial 
similarity test,43 hinted at by the district court for determining 
copyright infringement, and found for Whelan.  The court, 
relying on SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, 
Inc.,44 held that the non-literal elements, or structure of a 
computer program, which Whelan alleged were infringed, 
were protectable elements under the Copyright Act.45  The 
court determined that 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) “extends 
copyright protection to ‘literary works,’ and computer 
programs are classified as literary works for the purposes of 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 To present a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the 
plaintiff must prove two things: 1) that they do in fact own the copyright 
which they allege to have been infringed, and 2) that the copyright has 
been copied by the alleged infringer.  See Id. at 1231, see also Sid & 
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 
F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). 
41 Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d, 1222, 1228 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
42 Id. at 1233. 
43 The Substantial Similarity test is a single inquiry test where a 
finder of fact makes two findings of substantial similarity to support a 
copyright violation. First, the fact-finder must determine, with the aid of 
expert testimony, whether there is sufficient similarity between the two 
copyrighted works at issue to conclude whether the alleged infringer used 
the copyrighted work to make his/her own. Second, if the answer to the 
first question is in the affirmative, the fact-finder must determine, through 
layperson testimony, whether the copying was “illicit” or “an unlawful 
appropriation” of the copyrighted work. See e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 
F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946).  
44 SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 
816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (the only other case, at the time, which addressed 
the issue of non-literal vs. literal elements of a computer program) 
45 See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238–39. 
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copyright.”46 The court also noted that the copyrights of other 
literary works can be infringed even when there is no 
substantial similarity between the works literal elements.47 
The Third Circuit in Whelan created some controversy 
with its decision because it extended copyright protection to a 
facet of a program that lacked originality and completely 
ignored the idea-expression dichotomy.48  However, the 
Second Circuit in Computer Associates abandoned the Third 
Circuit’s reasoning in Whelan.49 
The Second Circuit, on appeal from the Eastern District 
of New York, took one giant stride further in Computer 
Associates50 than the Third Circuit did in Whelan.  The court 
                                                 
46 Id. at 1234; see also H.R. Rep. No.94-1476 at 5 (1976), 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 
5667.  
47 Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d, 1222,1234 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
48 Patry, supra note 17, at 51.   
The court in Whelan made note that its decision would be put at odds 
with Justice Higginbotham's opinion in Synercom Tech., Inc. v. 
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978), where 
Justice Higginbotham held that “input formats” of computer programs 
were ideas and not expression and, thus, were not copyrightable subject 
matter.  Justice Becker noted that the two cases may be distinguishable 
but still proceeded to “come to grips” with Higginbotham’s opinion in 
Synercom, and ultimately decided that Higginbotham’s distinction 
between the copyrightability of sequence and form in the computer 
context and in any other context, was an incorrect one. Whelan, 797 F.2d 
at 1240.  Becker’s reasoning was that since Congress has not yet passed 
any special provision differentiating between ordering and sequencing of 
computer programs, Higginbotham was incorrect to take it into his own 
hands. Id. 
49 Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 
1992).  It is important to clarify that Whelan was decided by the Third 
Circuit and Computer Associate’s was decided by the Second Circuit. 
Currently, the Supreme Court has yet to make a final determination as to 
the correct course of action.  As it stands now, there is a split between the 
nine circuits, the majority of which follow the Second Circuit in 
Computer Associates, with a small minority following the Third Circuit’s 
approach in Whelan. 
50 By  way  of  background,  both parties,  Computer  Associates 
[hereinafter CA] and Altai, were in the business of developing various 
types of computer software.  Involved in this dispute was CA’s program 
called “Scheduler,” and Altai’s program called “Zeke.”  “Scheduler” is a 
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devised a three prong “abstraction-filtration-comparison” 
test,51 when deciding the issue of computer program 
copyright infringement.  This test requires district courts to 
first dissect each component of the program and isolate each 
abstracted level contained in the specific computer program.52  
The court must then examine the structural components at 
each level that has been abstracted to determine if each 
abstraction is an idea or a copyright protected expression.53  
If the court found that any or all of the abstractions contained 
an expression, the final step was to determine if any of the 
expressions have been copied by the defendant.54 
                                                                                                     
program designed for IBM computers which acts as a business scheduler, 
and contains an important sub-component called “Adapter” which acts an 
operating system compatibility component, or translator.  “Scheduler” 
was designed to operate on an IBM System 370 family of computers 
which contain one of three operating systems, DOS/VSE, MVS, or CMS.  
“Adapter” is what allows “Scheduler” to operate on multiple operating 
systems without having to change software.  Altai’s “Zeke” program was 
designed to operate on a MVS operating system, similar to “Scheduler.” 
However, before “Zeke” became operational on a MVS system, an 
employee of Altai, James P. Williams, approached Claude F. Arney, III, a 
programmer employed by CA, about the possibility of him coming to 
Altai to help develop “Zeke’s” MVS system compatibility.  Arney 
participated substantially in the creation of “Adapter” while he was 
employed at CA, and although Williams knew about “Scheduler” and 
“Adapter,” he did not know that “Adapter” was a component of 
“Scheduler.” Arney left CA to work for Altai shortly thereafter and took 
copies of the source code for both the VSE and MVS versions of 
“Adapter.” Arney then, using the “Adapter’s” source code, created two 
versions of “Oscar,” Altai’s version of “Adapter,” which permitted 
“Zeke” to operate on a MVS and VSE operating system. 
51 Computer Assocs. Int’l., Inc v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 
706 (2d Cir. 1992) ; see also Justice Learned Hands decision in Nichols v. 
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.1930) (where Justice 
Hand articulated what is now known as the “abstractions” test for 
separating an idea from an expression [hereinafter referred to as the Idea-
Expression dichotomy]. 
52 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706–07. 
        53 Id. at 707; see also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[F], at 13 
62.34-63 (discusses the “successive filtering method” adopted by Justice 
Walker’s “filtration” prong to the “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test 
used in Computer Associates). 
54 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710. 
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This approach from Computer Associates has been said to 
be overly complicated, while the Whelan approach has been 
said to be overly simplistic.55  Which approach is most 
effective?  The three-prong test from Computer Associates.  
This is chiefly because it gives the court the opportunity to 
break down the program to its “bare-bones” to see what 
actually comprises it, which arguably, would allow the court 
to make a sound, correct decision when faced with a 
copyright infringement suit involving a computer program.  
The downside to this approach, well presented by Professor 
Patry,56 is that the three prong test devised by the Second 
Circuit benefits only one type of person, the expert witness, 
whose services are desperately needed by the courts since 
most judges, though not all, do not have backgrounds in 
computer programming.57 
The preceding discussion has focused on the history and 
reasonably simplistic nature of computer program protection 
under United States copyright law.58  The next section turns 
                                                 
55 Patry, supra note 17, at 55 
56 Patry, supra note 17, at 55. 
57 Remember, it is imperative for attorneys and law students to pay 
very close attention to the jurisdiction in which they are located to 
determine which approach the court in that jurisdiction follows.  
Remember, there is a split among the circuits as to which test is applied, 
i.e. the substantial similarity test devised by the Third Circuit, and the 
abstraction-filtration-comparison test developed by the Second Circuit. 
58 For an example of computer programs that have purposes to 
commit copyright infringement, see BMG Music, et al. v. Gonzalez, 430 
F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005). (defendant was found liable, at summary 
judgment, for “direct copyright infringement” by downloading 30 
copyrighted songs onto her computer using an on-line computer program 
search engine.  The court, in finding for the plaintiff recording companies, 
rejected the defendants “fair use” and “innocent infringer” defenses.  See 
also In Re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (it is not 
enough that a product [computer software] be capable of non-infringing 
uses.  A defendant must show evidence that the service has ever been 
used for such non-infringing uses); and A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, 
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (on its face the Copyright Act's definition of 
digital audio recording devices, computers are not digital audio recording 
devices because their 'primary purpose' is not to produce digital audio 
copied recordings). 
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to computer program protection under United States patent 
law. 
 
B.  United States Patent Law as Applied to 
                     Computer Programs 
 
“A patent offers greater protection . . . than a 
copyright, for it can protect the principle 
underlying a mechanism or process as well as 
the specific form.” 59 
 
Patents are a very powerful and desirable protection for 
inventors.60  As such, a computer program patent would make 
it illegal for any unauthorized person to make, use, or sell the 
patented program.61  However, it is extremely difficult for 
patent applicants to achieve that level of security because the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has 
treated applications for computer programs as a “special case, 
and set hurdle after hurdle in the way of treating them as 
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent 
Act.”62  Some have even claimed that software patents are the 
most scrutinized within the intellectual property world.63  The 
problems with computer programs are that they do not easily 
meet the strict standards for patents – novelty, utility and 
non-obviousness – and the Supreme Court has made it clear 
that these tests set a high standard.64   
Someone new to patent law may first look at computer 
programs and see a simple process, which, under the Patent 
                                                 
59 Jean F. Rydstrom, Patentability of Computer Programs, 6 ALR 
Fed 156, 160 (1971), citing Bender, Computer Programs: Should They be 
Patentable? 68 COLUMBIA L. REV. 241 (1968). 
60 GALLER, supra note 15, at 31. 
61 Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and 
Copyright Laws, 81 HARVARD L. REV. 1541, 1553 (1968). 
62 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 952. 
63 See  e.g.  Anthony  E.  Anderson,  Article,  Taming  The  Code: 
Effectively Implementing Software Patents, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 381, 382 (2006). 
64 Computer Programs, supra note 62; citing Graham v. John Deere, 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966). 
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Act, would be patentable subject matter.65  However, while 
simple, these processes can create problems for the courts, 
like ones with limited capabilities such as a process which 
recites mathematical algorithms, and, according to the courts, 
such mathematical algorithms were once not viewed as 
patentable subject matter.66  The issues concerning the 
patentability of computer programs has been a hot topic of 
judicial debate over the past twenty-five or so years, and this 
debate among the courts began with the 1972 Supreme Court 
decision, Gottschalk v. Benson.67  
The Supreme Court in Benson was faced with deciding 
whether an invention described as being similar to “the 
process of data by program and more particularly to the 
programmed conversion of numerical information” in 
general-purpose digital computers.68  To simplify the above 
invention, this process was essentially a method for 
“converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure 
binary numerals.”69  This method was what the court 
ultimately coined as a mathematical algorithm, or a 
“procedure for solving a given type of mathematical 
problem.”70 
Procedurally, in Benson, the PTO examiner initially 
rejected two claims of the application, claim 8 and claim 13, 
as being outside the scope of section 101 of the Patent Act.71  
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, however, 
sustained the same two claims which the PTO initially 
rejected.72  On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the 
PTO examiner, and held that this algorithm was outside the 
scope of patentable subject matter pursuant to section 101 of 
                                                 
65 Carstens, supra note 6, at 20. 
66 Id. 
67 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
68 Id. at 64; see also Ralph D. Clifford, The Federal Circuit’s Cruise 
to Uncharted Waters: How Patent Protection for Algorithms and Business 
Methods May Sink the UCITA and State Intellectual Property Protection, 
73 TEMPLE L. Rev. 1241, 1243 (2000), and Carstens, supra note 6 
69 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 64. 
70 Id. at 65. 
71 See Id., see also Clifford, supra note 68 
72 Benson, 409 U.S. at 65 
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the Patent Act. In so holding, the Court stated that “the 
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial 
practical application except in connection with a digital 
computer, which means that . . . the patent would wholly 
preempt the mathematical formula and . . . would be a patent 
on the algorithm itself.”73  Essentially what the Court did in 
Benson was create an exception to the scope of section 101 of 
the Patent Act, known as the “mathematical algorithm” 
exception,74 and refused to extend patent protection to 
computer programs because the algorithm “had no substantial 
practical application.”75   
Despite its admitted, albeit disguised, ignorance on the 
subject,76 the Supreme Court, upheld its Benson decision in 
the subsequent case of Parker v. Flook.77 This case involved 
an application for a patent on a “Method of Updating Alarm 
Limits.”78  The Court made an important initial distinction of 
this method in noting that the only novel feature of the 
method was the mathematical algorithm.79   
                                                 
73 Id. at 71–72. 
74 See Clifford, supra note 68 at 1242. 
75 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71. 
76 Of important note to this discussion, is that the Supreme Court, in 
dicta, made a few statements that seemed to be an “ill-fit” with the crux of 
its argument.  For example, the Court stated first that “[I]t may be that the 
patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a policy matter 
to which we are not competent to speak [emphasis added]. Benson, 409 
U.S., at 257.  The court then went on and practically conceded its 
ignorance on the topic when it said “[I]f these programs are to be 
patentable, considerable problems are raised which only committees of 
Congress can manage . . .” Id., at 258.  In its argument, the Court seemed 
to proffer a fairly coherent opinion while rejecting the patentability of a 
mathematical algorithm, but at the same time it conceded that it was 
totally ignorant on the subject.  So it is in this writers opinion that the 
Supreme Court was not yet prepared to handle such a case, and truly find 
it difficult to believe that this opinion was afforded a great amount of 
relevance. 
77 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). 
78 Id. at 585.   
    Essentially, an “alarm limit” is a number. These “alarm limits” 
were to be used in conjunction with catalytic conversion processes where 
the “alarm limit” would alert the user when the process approached an 
abnormal condition. 
79 Id. at 585.  
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Procedurally, the PTO examiner once again rejected the 
application and found that “the mathematical formula 
constituted the only difference between the prior art80 and the 
invention.”81 Following its actions taken in the Flook 
litigation, the C.C.P.A (predecessor to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit) reversed the PTO by reading Benson 
to apply to only those claims which sought to entirely 
preempt a mathematical algorithm, and that since the 
inventor’s process would not constitute infringement of the 
claims, a patent would not preempt the algorithm.82  Also 
adhering to its precedent was the Supreme Court, which 
reversed the C.C.P.A., and held that “[R]espondent’s 
application simply provides a new and presumably better 
method for calculating alarm limit values.”83 The Court 
opined further, and more importantly, that the “ . . . process is 
un-patentable under § 101, not because it contains a 
mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once 
that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the 
application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable 
invention.”84   
In Flook, the Supreme Court once again rejected the 
patentability of a mathematical algorithm/computer program, 
but the Flook decision was not unanimous, as there were 
three dissenting Justices.  The crux of the Dissent’s argument 
was that this case was far different from Benson in that the 
mathematical algorithm at issue in Flook comprised only one 
step of the entire process, whereas in Benson, the 
mathematical algorithm was the invention.85  The Supreme 
Court’s stubbornness to uphold a patent for a “computer 
                                                 
80 Prior Art is the crux of the statutory bar of novelty under Patent 
law.  An invention is in the prior art if it has already been patented or 
described in a printed publication in any country, or if it is in public use or 
on sale in the United States, for more than one year prior to the date the 
patent is applied for. See generally 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b). 
81 Flook, 437 U.S. at  587. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 594–95. 
84 Id. at 594. 
85 See id. at 599. 
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related” program did not stop the Federal Circuit from 
holding otherwise, and the debate continued. 
For example, the Federal Circuit’s decision, Application 
of Diehr,86 demonstrated its stern opposition to the Supreme 
Court’s view on the subject.87 Reminiscent of its previous 
actions, the PTO examiner, utilizing the Court’s reasoning 
from Flook, rejected the inventor’s claims88  On appeal, 
however, the Federal Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Benson and Flook did not deny patentability to a 
claim as non-statutory simply because it involved a computer 
program or because it was computer related.89 The Federal 
Circuit was of the opinion that “claims may be rejected under 
section 101 because they attempt to embrace only . . .  a 
mathematical algorithm . . . but not merely because they 
define inventions having something to do with a computer.”90  
Basically, instead of removing the algorithm claim to 
determine the patentability of the remaining claims [like the 
Supreme Court], the Federal Circuit in Diehr looked at all the 
claims, including the algorithm claim, and found for 
patentability because the claims, as a whole, satisfied the 
requirements for patent.  Once again, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine if this court was correct.91 
Astonishingly, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal 
Circuit’s granting of the patent at issue, marking the first time 
the “high-nine” affirmed the patentability of a computer-
related invention.92  The Supreme Court held the way it did 
because it totally set aside anything to do with the 
mathematical algorithm and decided whether the process for 
molding rubber, as a whole, was patentable subject matter 
                                                 
86 Application of Diehr, 602 F.2d 982 (1979). 
87 Diehr  involved  a  method  for  operating  molding  presses  used 
during the manufacture of rubber products.  This method, to be 
successful, relied upon a mathematical equation called the “Arrhenius 
equation.” For a discussion on the Arrhenius equation, see Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 178, n. 2 (1981).  
88 Application of Diehr, 602 F.2d at 984–85. 
89 Id. at 986. 
90 Id. at 986–87. 
91 See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 175. 
92 See Id. 
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within section 101 of the Patent Act.93  This landmark 
decision, although very similar to the Benson-Flook line of 
cases, opened the floodgates for computer program patents in 
the United States.94 
Subsequent to the court’s decision in In Re Lowry,95 the 
Patent and Trademark Office began to take notice of the issue 
and realized that it was time to start paying heed to patent 
applications for computer-type programs.  In Lowry,96 the 
court noted that in determining the novelty of a computer 
memory, which embodied a novel data structure, the Patent 
and Trademark Office could not disregard the data structure 
on the ground that it constituted unpatentable printed 
matter.97  In its decision, the Federal Circuit essentially 
summoned the PTO, and for the PTO, it was a wake-up call. 
                                                 
93 Id. at 191. 
94 Following  the  Diehr  decision,  a  vast  amount  of Federal Circuit 
cases upheld patents for computer-related programs in 1994, including In 
Re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed.Cir.1994) (where it was held that a patent 
that functionally defined a machine that manipulated data for an 
oscilloscope display was patentable subject matter under §101 of the 
Patent Act); In Re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed.Cir.1994) (which held 
that a machine with a data structure embedded in its memory qualified for 
a patent, although a method for generating a data structure did not); and In 
Re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed.Cir.1994) (where the court held that when 
a functional step [i.e., a physical display of data] was added to a once 
unpatentable algorithm, the whole method would pass muster for 
patentability); see also Goldstein, supra note 10, at 953. 
95 In Re Lowry,  32 F.3d 1579 (Fed.Cir.1994);   see also  GOLDSTEIN, 
supra note 10, at 953.  
96 Lowry involved a patent application for a “Data Processing System 
Having a Data Structure with a Single, Simple Primitive.” 32 F.3d at 
1580.  This invention was basically a memory storage program and 
effectively organized and stored data in a computer memory.  The Patent 
examiner rejected claims 1-5 of the application as unpatentable subject 
matter pursuant to the section 101 of the Patent Act, and also rejected 
claims 20–29 as unpatentable pursuant to section 102(e). Claims 1–19 
were also rejected pursuant to section 103 of the Act.  The Board reversed 
the Examiners rejection of claims 1–5 and held that “a memory containing 
stored information, as a whole, recited an article of manufacture,” and 
was patentable subject matter. Id. at 1582.  The Board affirmed the 
Examiner’s rejection pertaining to sections 102(2) and 103.  Lowry 
appealed. 
97 In Re Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1582. 
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Subsequent to Lowry, yet another controversial, but 
important case in the computer program patent war came 
down from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group, Inc,98 where the court expressly ignored the 
Supreme Court’s “mathematical algorithm exception.” 
In State Street, a patent for a “data processing system for 
Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration”99 was 
applied for.100  The court was forced to decide whether this 
patent was invalid for failing to state a claim of statutory 
subject matter as required pursuant to section 101 of the 
Patent Act.  The court held, that the “mathematical algorithm 
exception,” created by the Supreme Court in Benson, when 
applied to Claim 1 of the “hub and spoke” invention at issue, 
was not applicable because the algorithm encompassing 
Claim 1 produced a “useful, concrete, and tangible result,” 
which “renders it statutory subject matter, even if the useful 
result is expressed in numbers . . .”101 The court upheld the 
patent.102 
State Street has been viewed by some to be a 
controversial decision because it upheld a patent that claimed 
nothing more than mathematical equations while at the same 
time failed to claim any specific algorithm.103 Some have 
argued that the court upholds patents, like the one at issue in 
                                                 
98 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 
1368 (1998). 
        99 Essentially, this invention facilitated a structure whereby mutual 
funds pool their assets into an investment portfolio organized as a 
partnership. See Id. Such a system is referred to as a “Hub and Spoke” 
system. See id. 
100 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370. 
        101 See id. at 1375; see also In Re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (data transformed by a machine through a series of mathematical 
equations which produced a smooth display on a rasterizer monitor, 
constituted “a practical application of an abstract idea” because “a useful, 
concrete and tangible result” was produced). 
102 The Federal Circuit acted to essentially dispose of the so-called 
“business method exception.” The business method exception was 
basically a judicially created exception to section 101 of the Patent Act, 
very similar to that of the mathematical algorithm exception.  
        103 See Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent 
System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299, 302–03 (2005). 
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State Street, because the PTO and the Federal Circuit have 
developed a “land rush” mentality toward patents, meaning 
the more patents they can issue the better.104 Such a mentality 
has been said to create a significant mental block among the 
basic institutions of this country’s original patent system 
concerning the simple, but important, notation of balance, 
which had made this system so effective in the first place.105 
Notwithstanding its controversial decision, the Federal 
Circuit subsequently decided AT&T Corp. v. Excel 
Communications, Inc.,106 and effectively upheld its 
contentious decision in State Street, and again refused to 
apply the mathematical algorithm exception.  
In AT&T, the court was faced with deciding whether an 
invention described as a “Call Message Recording for 
Telephone Systems” was patentable subject matter within the 
meaning of section 101 of the Patent Act.107 The PTO 
initially rejected this patent application for reasons unrelated 
to section 101.108 The district court upheld the PTO’s 
rejection on the grounds that the patent implicitly recited a 
mathematical algorithm and that the only physical step in the 
claims involved the data-gathering process for the algorithm, 
and thus, was excluded from patentability under the 
“mathematical algorithm exception.”109 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted, at the outset, that 
“[W]hether stated implicitly or explicitly, we consider the 
scope of section 101 to be the same regardless of the form – 
machine or process – in which a particular claim is 
                                                 
104 See id. at 303–04. 
105 See id. at 304. 
106 AT&T Corp v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, (1999); 
cert. denied 528 U.S. 946 (1999).  
107 See id. at 1353. 
This Call Message Recording System contained a three step process for 
when a caller made a direct-dialed long distance telephone call: 1) after 
the long-distance phone call was placed and recognized by its local 
exchange carrier (LEC) it would be routed automatically to a primary 
inter-exchange carrier (PIC); 2) the PIC then carries the phone call to the 
LEC which serves the recipient of the call; and 3) the recipient’s LEC 
delivered the call to the recipient, using the local network. See Id. at 1354. 
108 AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1354. 
109 Id. at 1355–56. 
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drafted.”110  “In fact, whether the invention is a process or a 
machine is irrelevant . . . and we are comfortable in applying 
our reasoning in Alappat and State Street to the method 
claims at issue in this case.”111  Thus, the court expressly 
affirmed its decisions in those two previous cases.  
Thereafter, the Federal Circuit focused its analysis on the 
issue at hand, “whether the mathematical algorithm is applied 
in a practical manner to produce a useful result.”112  The court 
held in the affirmative.  It held that the district court failed to 
apply the appropriate analysis to the method claims at issue 
and that had they conducted the proper analysis, it would 
have easily found that the claims applied for would have 
clearly fallen within the scope of section 101 of the Patent 
Act.113 
The Federal Circuit has effectively discarded the 
“mathematical algorithm exception” once implemented by 
the Supreme Court in Benson, and has essentially permitted 
the patenting of both computer program patents, patents that 
comprise a mathematical algorithm, and also patents for 
business methods.  As a result, the PTO has been showered 
with applications for the very same.  
One can see the difficulty computer programs cause for 
the PTO and for the courts in this country.  To help evade the 
eradication of the United States Patent system as applied to 
computer programs, this article now turns to a discussion on 
how international governments have attached intellectual 
property protection for computer programs. 
 
 
II.  COMPUTER PROGRAM PROTECTION UNDER AN 
                  INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW  
                  REGIME 
 
The purpose of this section is to introduce a model of an 
international approach to intellectual property law as it 
                                                 
110 Id. at 1357. 
111 Id. at 1358. 
112 Id. at 1360. 
113 Id. at 1361. 
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applies to computer programs.  Although only the surface 
will be penetrated, this section aims to summarize the 
approach taken by the European Community in codifying its 
own intellectual property legislation specific to computer 
programs.  European intellectual property law was chosen to 
assist the law student and/or attorney with this discussion 
because Europe follows an approach in which the United 
States should follow.  Review of international approaches 
was also chosen because in the United States legal education 
system, exclusive of courses and programs devoted to 
international law, there is very little exposure to international 
legislation, particularly international intellectual property 
law.114 
 
A.  The European Community’s Approach to 
                    Intellectual Property Protection for 
                   Computer Programs 
 
Research conducted on this issue, and how it has been 
approached by the European Community, revealed a very 
impressive approach as to how the European Community 
(“EC”)115 handled the complexity of the situation that is 
computer programs.  On May 14, 1991, the EC’s Council of 
Ministers adopted the Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs.116  With the enactment of this Software 
Directive, the EC leapt ahead of the United States and Japan, 
two world leaders in computer programming and 
technology.117 
What is ideal about this directive is that its drafters 
recognized the dilemma concerning computer programs.  In 
the Preamble of the Software Directive, for example, several 
                                                 
114 This, of course, is also exclusive of courses and/or lectures about 
the Berne Convention on Copyright, and other similar treaties to which 
the United States is, or is not a party or signatory to. 
115 The European Community  is  now  commonly  referred to as the 
European Union, or EU. 
116 Council  Directive  91/250/EEC  of 14 May 1991 on  the  Legal 
Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 [hereinafter 
Software Directive]; see also Palmer & Vinje, supra note 121, at 65. 
117 See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 121, at 66. 
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provisions explain why this Directive has been passed; one 
such provision reads, “ . . . computer programs are playing an 
increasingly important role in a broad range of industries and 
computer program technology can accordingly be considered 
as being of fundamental importance for the Community’s 
industrial development.”118  This provision clearly recognizes 
the significance of computer programs in European society.   
Article 1(1) continues, “[I]n accordance with the provisions 
of this Directive, Member States shall protect computer 
programs, by copyright, as literary works within the meaning 
of the Berne Convention….”119    The EC has recognized the 
significance of computer programs, the problems associated 
with protecting them, and that they should be protected under 
European copyright law as literary works.  
With the passing of the Software Directive, the EC has 
essentially created a sui generis120 body of law, which is the 
approach that this writer suggests the United States Congress 
must take. 121Several Articles of the directive mirror United 
States copyright law.  Specifically, Article 4(a) of the 
Directive includes some very special language which the 
                                                 
118 Software Directive, supra note 116, at Preamble. 
119 Id. at Article 1(1). 
      Also, Article 1(2) stated, similar to the American Idea-Expression 
dichotomy, that only the expressions of a computer program are to be 
protected by this Directive and any ideas and principles associated with 
any element of a program are not to be protected under the Directive. 
120 For a discussion on sui generis legislation, see Pamela Samuelson, 
Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the 
Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1986). 
121 Although the Software Directive specifically states that copyright 
law is to be used, the EC has devised legislation specific to computer 
programs, which comprises some copyright and some patent law in terms 
of the American definition, which is very much like creating a sui generis 
body of law.  Congress has enacted sui generis legislation before when it 
passed the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
620, tit. III, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§901-914 (Supp. II 
1984)); see also Samuelson, supra at 471 n.3. Prior to that Act, Congress 
had enacted sui generis type legislation when it provided for protection 
for non-obvious ornamental designs for articles of manufacture in 1870, 
see Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230,§71-76, 16 Stat. 198, 209–10 (codified at 
35 U.S.C. §171-173 (1982)) cited by Samuelson, supra at 472 n.4. 
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United States must implement into its own sui generis 
legislation.  
Article 4(a) of the Directive permits the owner of a 
program to have the exclusive right to do or authorize 
“. . . the permanent or temporary reproduction of a computer 
program by any means and in any form, in part or in 
whole.”122  This sounds very similar to United States 
copyright law.  Article 4(a) continues, “[i]nsofar as loading, 
displaying, running, transmission or storage of the computer 
program necessitate such reproduction, such acts shall be 
subject to authorization by the rightholder.”123  Again, this 
parallels United States Copyright law.  This section of the 
Directive reads like a hybrid body of law comprising mostly 
copyright law, with some patent law mixed in.  The first part 
of Article 4(a) reads much like the copyright system in the 
U.S., giving the holder the absolute right to copy his or her 
work, and the second part reads somewhat like patent law 
giving the holder the exclusive right to control how the 
program is used, reproduced or distributed, including the 
holder’s right to express authorization. However, to better 
understand what Europe has actually done, let us explore 
Article 4 a little more deeply. 
Article 4(b) of the Software Directive permits the right 
holder with “the right to do or to authorize . . . the translation, 
adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration of a 
computer program and the reproduction of the results 
thereof . . .”124  Article 4(c) permits the right holder “to do or 
to authorize. . . any form of distribution to the public . . . of 
the original computer program or of copies thereof.”125 
The remainder of Article 4 illustrated above seems to 
represent more copyright law than patent law.  For example, 
Article 4(b) permits the author to control how the computer 
program is translated, adapted, arranged or altered, which is 
one of the protections granted under American copyright law.  
Article 4(c) of the Directive permits the author to control how 
                                                 
122 Software Directive, supra note 124, at art. 4(a). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at Art. 4(b). 
125 Id. at Art. 4(c). 
132 Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property  Vol. 3 
 
the computer program is distributed to the public, which is 
also a protection granted under American copyright law.  The 
right to use, make or sell an invention126 is the crux of 
American patent law, and some of that can be read into 
Article 4(c) above.127  So, although Article 4(a) and 4(c) 
contain some language which can be associated with 
American patent law, Europe has essentially taken European 
copyright law and explicitly applied it to computer 
programs.128 
In so doing, Europe has created a unique and peculiar 
body of law, sui generis, by taking bits and pieces of its own 
Copyright law, and applied it directly to computer programs.  
Undoubtedly, it would not seem to be all that taxing for 
Congress to take a similar approach and enact a sui generis 
body of law,129 both detailed and specific, which would act to 
                                                 
126 See generally 35 U.S.C.A §154. 
        127 For  example,  the  phrase  “distributed  to  the  public,”  may  be 
interpreted to possibly mean “selling.” 
128 For an analysis of the Software Directive in the European Court of 
Justice, see Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 22 
December 2004, Microsoft Corp. v.  Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys, 
Proceedings for interim relief - Article 82 EC. Case T-201/04 R, 
available at 2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 704 (2004) (this case was a dispute 
between Microsoft Corporation and Sun Microsystems, where Sun 
alleged that Microsoft was abusing its dominant position when it refused 
to disclose to it the technology necessary to allow interoperability of its 
work group server operating system with the Windows Client PC 
operating system.  The court noted that the communications protocols 
were protected by copyright under the Berne and by Council Directive 
91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer 
programs. Thus, the court held that although Microsoft’s communications 
protocols were protected by copyright, implementation of the 
communications protocols does not constitute a form of exploitation 
prohibited by copyright). 
        129 Congress has already enacted quasi-sui generis legislation when it 
extended copyright protection to computer programs in machine-readable 
form when it passed section 10 of the Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §101 (1982) and 
17 U.S.C.A. §117, cited by Samuelson, supra at 474 n. 12.  However, 
these amendments made to the Copyright Act were relatively minor, 
because all Congress did was add a definition of computer program into 
section 101, and by substituting an amended section 117 which gave 
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simplify intellectual property protection for computer 
programs in the United States system.   
III.  WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE 
Currently, the Patent and Trademark Office is teeming 
with patent applications, where approximately 443,652 
patents were applied for in the 2006 fiscal year.130 In the 
same year, only 183,187 patents were issued.131 That means 
260,465 patent applications were either denied or not 
prosecuted.  With respect to patent applications for computer 
software, in 2003 there were approximately 25,475 patent 
applications for computer software and approximately 12,371 
applications for mathematical algorithms.132  In addition, an 
application for software will be pending, on average, for 
forty-four months.133  These facts have created significant 
uproar amongst proponents of computer software patents.134 
Because of this alarming number of patent applications, and 
the amount of time it can take to prosecute a computer 
software patent, the Patent Act needs major revision.  
Specifically, section 3 of the Patent Act135 must be 
revised to address this patent mishandling problem by 
                                                                                                     
owners of copyrighted computer programs a limited right to modify them 
and archive copies of them.  See e.g., Samuelson, supra, at 474–75 n. 12. 
        130 United  States  Patent  and  Trademark  Office,  2006  Fiscal  Year 
USPTO Workloads, Table 2, available at  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/50302_table2.html 
[Hereinafter USPTO] (This number is a 312,249 increase from the 
131,403 patents applied for in 1986). 
131 Id. at Table 6. 
132 Allen Clark Zoracki,  When is an Algorithm Invented? The Need 
for a New Paradigm for Evaluating an Algoritgm for Intellectual 
Property Protection, 15 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 579, 585 (2005).  [I was 
unable to verify the accuracy of these numbers, hence why the term 
approximately was used.  I was also unable, after an exhaustive search, to 
locate more current numbers. However, it is fair to say that the number of 
applications for software has drastically increased from 2003]. 
133 USPTO, supra at Table 4. 
134 See Anderson, supra note 64, at 383. 
135 Section 3 of the United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §§1-376, is 
the section that establishes the directors and employees of the PTO.  I 
believe the scope of section 3 should be broadened and/or specified to 
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broadening the scope of examiners permitted to prosecute 
patents at the PTO.  The only way computer program 
applications can be prosecuted fairly and thoroughly, is to 
increase the number of examiners, as a whole, and also 
ensure that they come with computer programming 
backgrounds. 
In the alternative, if the Patent Act cannot undergo major 
revision, and pursuant to the goal and purpose of this article, 
Congress must enact a completely separate body of law 
specific to computer programs.  Such a distinctive body of 
law is referred to as a sui generis legal regime, taking bits and 
pieces from both copyright and patent, and blending them 
together.136  By passing such a body of law specific to 
computer programs, this country will be able to avoid future 
divergence between the courts, and would also ease the 
tension and stress of prosecuting computer program patents. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Should Congress use copyright law, patent law or a 
quantity of both?  You may recall this question being posed 
to you at the beginning of this note.  That is the question that 
I have attempted to resolve throughout, and the answer to this 
question should have been readily apparent, sui generis 
legislation is needed.   
As articulated above, sui generis legislation is a body of 
law that is unique or peculiar, and not specific to one area of 
law.137  This is chiefly the case because one specific area of 
law is not, in itself, always sufficient to deal with a complex 
legal issue; here, intellectual property protection for computer 
programs.138  In dealing with the convolution that is caused 
by computer programs, copyright law and patent law, 
respectively each by itself, do not offer a comprehensive 
                                                                                                     
allow for examiners to come from a broader range of educational 
backgrounds, including computer programming. 
136 Palmer  &  Vinje,  The  EC  Directive  on  the   Legal  Protection  
of Computer Software: New Law Governing Software Development, 
2 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 65, 66 (1992). 
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body of legislation. Such a lack of depth ultimately deprives 
the courts of the opportunity to meticulously preside over 
litigation involving computer programs.  Thus, it is 
imperative for Congress to enact sui generis legislation 
specific to computer programs, whereby molding pieces of 
both copyright law and patent law together into one unique 
body of law. 
To achieve such a result, Congress should mirror the 
Software Directive enacted by Parliament in the European 
Community.  It is clear that the EC Parliament recognized the 
crisis that computer programs presented to its intellectual 
property legislation, and it wasted little time in enacting 
appropriate legislation to resolve that problem.  Hopefully, 
Congress can work toward achieving the same goal 
  
 
